La asociación entre educación y democracia es insepar a b le del pensamiento democrá tico. La escuela es una institución fundamental que resultan tener a su c a r go, en la m a y oría de los Estados mode r nos, los poderes pú b licos. Esta b lecida sobre el principio de iguald a d , la instrucción pú b lica pr e vé el aprendizaje y la profundización en la ciudadanía política y social. P er mite tanto (...) disf r utar de los derechos del hombre y ejercer las libe r tades fundamentales, como comprender los deberes y las restricciones inherentes a la prese r v ación de la "cosa pú b lica". Sin emba r go, en F rancia ha sufrido remodelaciones: la "inst r ucción cívica" se ha co n v er tido en la "educación para la ciudadanía". Se ha operado un deslizamiento desde la fo r mación en el espíritu crítico hacia la obediencia a la autoridad. El "c i vismo", con una función política esencial en la democracia, se ha ocultado bajo la "c i vilidad", que tiene una connotación inn e g a b lemente moral. Ahora bien, la c i vilidad e x clu y e la aprehensión de las solidaridades inherentes al n e xo social y no i n v estiga las vías de la socialización política de los (futuros) ciudadanos. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, récemment traduit de l’anglais, a été coordonné par deux universitaires américaines parties de cette constatation que l’histoire des religions a toujours été observée sous l’angle masculin et qu’il n’existait pas d’étude approfondie concernant l’approche féminine de la religion et le comportement religieux spécifique des femmes. L’ouvrage met donc les femmes sur le devant de la scène pour les aborder en tant que sujet et non objet d’étude, avec leurs propres expériences et aspira...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Genevieve Lloyd THE SELF AS FICTION: PHILOSOPHY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY And so it goes on. All the time I'm dressing up the figure of myself in my own mind, lovingly, stealthily, not openly adoring it, for if I did that, I should catch myself out, and stretch my hand at once for a book in self-protection. Indeed it is curious how instinctively one protects the image of oneself from (...) idolatry or any other handling that could make it ridiculous, or too unlike the original to be believed in any longer. Or is it not so very curious at all? It is a matter of great importance. Suppose the looking-glass smashes, the image disappears, and the romantic figure with the green of forest depths all about it is there no longer, but only that shell of a person which is seen by other people — what an airless, shallow, bald, prominent world it becomes! A world not to be lived in. Virginia Woolf, "The Mark on the WaIl" ' The anxiety Virginia Woolf describes is, at one level, a familiar, everyday one of self-esteem. But the passage can also be read as expressing a more metaphysical unease about our conception ofwhat it is to be a self at all. Our difficulties in preventing the "romantic figure with the green of forest depuis all about it" from collapsing back into mat "shell of a person which is seen by other people" have philosophical roots. We have inherited ideals of objective knowledge which put severe restraints on the capacity to construct our selves as fictions. Our selves are part ofthe world and our representations of mem must conform to standards of truth. Yet we also want to separate our selves out from the world we know. As a knowing self, I am not merely an object of knowledge, but its luminous, though elusive, source and structuring center. My subjectivity seems to give me a special status in the world. But it is difficult to see how mat special status is to be reconciled with ideals of objective knowledge. As Thomas Nagel sums up the philosophical dilemma, in Mortal Questions, we are impelled, on the one hand, to resist an entirely "external" view ofwhat we most essentially are and do. But this sense ofour irreduci168 Genevieve Lloyd169 ble subjectivity comes up against an equally strong drive to include human beings and everything about diem as contents of a world mat can be understood "objectively." Our awareness of ourselves involves a sense of how the world is experienced from a particular point of view. But this idea of what the world is like from different points of view is at odds with our inherited ideals ofknowledge. To qualify as real, diings must be there independendy of particular points of view. Objectivity demands setting aside the "internal" viewpoint in an attempt to see die world, as it were, from no point of view at all. Yet we do feel mat our awareness of being ourselves cannot be reduced to the awareness of being the particular persons with the determinate properties we have, there to be perceived from perspectives not our own.2 As Arthur Prior puts the point, in his paper "Identifiable Individuals," an exchange of properties between Julius Caesar and Mark Antony might leave the world looking exacdy the same to us, but certainly not to Caesar or Antony. The experience of being called Julius Caesar or being murdered on me ides of March are very different experiences from being called Mark Antony or dallying on the Nile with Cleopatra.3 This seems to suggest mat my awareness ofbeing myself cannot be equated wim awareness of being some person with a determinate set of properties. It was, of course, precisely that kind of consideration which prompted Descartes, in the Meditations, to postulate the self as a pure ego, which remains the same regardless ofany imagined change in outer circumstances. It is the thought experiment of shedding all his actual properties which prompts him to treat the self as a special kind of object, immune to the fluctuations and uncertainties that afflict others. But, as Bernard Williams has pointed out, in his article "Imagination and... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, récemment traduit de l’anglais, a été coordonné par deux universitaires américaines parties de cette constatation que l’histoire des religions a toujours été observée sous l’angle masculin et qu’il n’existait pas d’étude approfondie concernant l’approche féminine de la religion et le comportement religieux spécifique des femmes. L’ouvrage met donc les femmes sur le devant de la scène pour les aborder en tant que sujet et non objet d’étude, avec leurs propres expériences et aspira...

Cet ouvrage, récemment traduit de l’anglais, a été coordonné par deux universitaires américaines parties de cette constatation que l’histoire des religions a toujours été observée sous l’angle masculin et qu’il n’existait pas d’étude approfondie concernant l’approche féminine de la religion et le comportement religieux spécifique des femmes. L’ouvrage met donc les femmes sur le devant de la scène pour les aborder en tant que sujet et non objet d’étude, avec leurs propres expériences et aspira...

Investigations apropos of the passage in Ovid to which we shall ultimately come have revealed that one kind of Latin genitive at least is still far from satisfactorily charted by authorities more eminent even than M'Turk. This is the genitive of material. More often than not grammarians and commentators do not distinguish this usage from the genitive of definition. So for instance at Ovid, Met. 3. 315 the phrase lactis alimenta is identified by Bomer ad loc. and by H. J. (...) Roby , ii. § 1302) as genitive of definition. This is correct as far as it goes, in the sense that lactis defines the alimenta; but the definition is what they were made of, their material. So again at Met. I. III flumina iam lactis, iam ftumina nectaris ibant the rivers consisted of milk and nectar. This passage, however, was classified by J. N. Madvig , p. 249) under expressions involving number, measure or quantity. This is not unreasonable, but Madvig's examples illustrate the need for care in drawing the line. They include, for instance, aceruus frumenti and uini tres amphorae. Now a heap may be thought of as containing its constituents, but it also consists o/them, which is not true of a vessel and its contents. Thus, though there is some semantic justification for including both these expressions, as Madvig did, under the ‘measure or quantity’ rubric, they are nevertheless grammatically distinct. The fluidity of the borderlines in this area is evident also in flumina lactis, an undeniable genitive of material which is, however, clearly analogous to a not uncommon class of expressions such as riuus/fons aquae, lapidum imber, uolumina fumi, campus harenae, silicum uenae, δατος ος, κρνη δατος, ργρου πηγ, etc., in which the notion of quantity as well as composition is present. (shrink)

Investigations apropos of the passage in Ovid to which we shall ultimately come have revealed that one kind of Latin genitive at least is still far from satisfactorily charted by authorities more eminent even than M'Turk. This is the genitive of material. More often than not grammarians and commentators do not distinguish this usage from the genitive of definition. So for instance at Ovid, Met. 3. 315 the phrase lactis alimenta is identified by Bomer ad loc. and by H. J. (...) Roby, ii. § 1302) as genitive of definition. This is correct as far as it goes, in the sense that lactis defines the alimenta; but the definition is what they were made of, their material. So again at Met. I. III flumina iam lactis, iam ftumina nectaris ibant the rivers consisted of milk and nectar. This passage, however, was classified by J. N. Madvig, p. 249) under expressions involving number, measure or quantity. This is not unreasonable, but Madvig's examples illustrate the need for care in drawing the line. They include, for instance, aceruus frumenti and uini tres amphorae. Now a heap may be thought of as containing its constituents, but it also consists o/them, which is not true of a vessel and its contents. Thus, though there is some semantic justification for including both these expressions, as Madvig did, under the ‘measure or quantity’ rubric, they are nevertheless grammatically distinct. The fluidity of the borderlines in this area is evident also in flumina lactis, an undeniable genitive of material which is, however, clearly analogous to a not uncommon class of expressions such as riuus/fons aquae, lapidum imber, uolumina fumi, campus harenae, silicum uenae, ὔδατος ῥος, κρνη ὔδατος, ργρου πηγ, etc., in which the notion of quantity as well as composition is present. (shrink)

‘The reading of the MSS, and not the Renaissance correction e, is certainly what L. wrote.’ So Kenney in his edition of Lucretius 3.1 I believe that he is right, but that the case for o rests on different grounds from those which he adduces. Kenney quotes D.A. West 's statement that e is ‘not worthy of the precise and vivid imagination of this poet’, and himself finds it anaemic by contrast with the sonorous o.2 These are subjective (...) judgements. One can only reply by expressing disagreement and pointing out that e has seemed unexceptionable to the numerous editors who have printed it and have preferred it to o. (shrink)

‘The reading of the MSS, and not the Renaissance correction e, is certainly what L. wrote.’ So Kenney in his edition of Lucretius 3.1 I believe that he is right, but that the case for o rests on different grounds from those which he adduces. Kenney quotes D.A. West 's statement that e is ‘not worthy of the precise and vivid imagination of this poet’, and himself finds it anaemic by contrast with the sonorous o.2 These are subjective (...) judgements. One can only reply by expressing disagreement and pointing out that e has seemed unexceptionable to the numerous editors who have printed it and have preferred it to o. (shrink)

The Ohio State University Press is to be congratulated, and Lennon and Olscamp are to be thanked for this book. Nicholas Malebranche has always been a major philosopher on the Continent but he has been less well-known in recent times within the English-speaking world. The Search was twice translated into English at the close of the seventeenth century and Malebranche was widely read and commented upon in English in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke wrote about Malebranche. David (...) Hume not only cites him, Hume's analysis of causation is thought to owe much to Malebranche's doctrine. Some of Berkeley's earliest critics took him to be a Malebranchist. A. A. Luce argued some years ago that Malebranche is one of the most important philosophical influences upon Berkeley. Accordingly it is a delight to have the full text available and I hope it will be possible to produce a paper-back version. This translation is based on the edition of the Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche under the general editorship of André Robinet. This includes definitive editions of the Recherche and the Éclaircissements edited by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis. (shrink)

Martial Gueroult (1891–1976) Belonged to a remarkable generation of French scholars of early modern philosophy, in general, and of Descartes’s thought, in particular. This cohort includes such notable figures as Étienne Gilson (1884–1978), Jean Laporte (1a886–1948), Henri Gouhier (1898–1994), Ferdinand Alquié (1908–85), and Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (1918–2004). However, Gueroult was the only one of this group to publish a commentary devoted exclusively to Descartes’s Meditations, namely, his Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons;1 indeed, no other comparable French commentary has appeared since the (...) time of its initial publication.2 In addition, among the very important works on Descartes that Gueroult’s French .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 223-224 [Access article in PDF] Jacqueline Broad. Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x + 191. Cloth, $55.00. In this impressive study of early Modern Philosophy, Jacqueline Broad analyzes the influence that Cartesianism has had in the development of feminist thought. Her work covers the early modern philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, (...) Ann Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Cudworth Masham and Catherine Trotter Cockburn. She points out the paradoxical relationship between current feminist philosophy and the writings of early Modern women. Broad concentrates on the metaphysical issues of mind-body dualism, thinking matter, and the role of reason in knowledge.Recent feminists have argued that even though Cartesianism appears to emphasize an egalitarian concept of reason, it entails a male bias which excludes women from philosophy. Broad covers the work of Genevieve Lloyd, Hilda Smith, Margaret Atherton and other feminists. Her goal is to show that the common Cartesian interpretation of early women's writings obscures the anti-Cartesian and anti-dualist aspects of their thought. Like Lloyd, she argues that historically women were associated with a lesser form of reason following the rise of Cartesianism.The conflict between reason and femininity is noted in the complexity of early Modern thought. Broad argues that even though Elisabeth is remembered as a critic of Descartes, many of her suggestions are not as anti-dualist as some scholars believe. Broad highlights the critical content of Elisabeth's letters to Descartes and discusses her criticisms of dualism and her Cartesian method of discovering truth and certainty. On the basis of her letters she contends that Elisabeth can be regarded as a precursor to feminist philosophers who give an equal role to the body and emotions in their metaphysical and ethical writings.Like Elisabeth, Margaret Cavendish rejects Cartesian dualism. The common thread that runs through early Modern feminist philosophy is the argument that interaction between two unlike substances is inconceivable. Broad argues that like Cavendish, Anne Conway ascribes spiritual characteristics to the body and material properties to the soul. According to Broad, their ontological views amount to a rejection of the stereotypes of femininity.Broad argues that Mary Astell's metaphysical views diverge from the modern Cartesians of her time. Although she is indebted to Descartes, Broad contends that she supports a metaphysical system which avoids some of the gender biases identifiable in Cartesianism. Astell, for example, does not find a life based on reason as a rival to a life concerned with the body; her emphasis on rationality is simply a reaction to the stereotype of women as irrational material beings.Damaris Masham is generally considered a philosophical rival of Astell, but Broad argues that Masham's arguments are focused on the same presuppositions as Astell's. She argues that both philosophers champion women's education, criticize the occasionalism of Norris and believe in interaction between the corporeal and incorporeal worlds. Broad emphasizes the common theological outlook inspired by Cambridge Platonism. Contrary to the interpretation of Ruth Perry, she finds that there is sufficient evidence that Masham was positively inspired by the second part of Astell's Serious Proposal.Broad concludes with an analysis of Catherine Cockburns' metaphysics and moral philosophy. According to Cockburn, women's ignorance is simply the result of being discouraged from rational pursuits. Cockburn's defense of Locke's notion of thinking matter and her rejection of Cartesian notions of substance mark the end of the Cartesian influence on women philosophers in England. [End Page 223]Broad has shown that a reverence for reason and dualistic theories do not necessarily go hand in hand. She points out that early Modern feminist thinkers are not simply handmaidens to the great philosophical masters. As other scholars have argued, one can find unique approaches to substance as well as original moral positions.This text is a significant contribution to the literature on early Modern philosophy. Broad's in depth analysis will not fail to interest scholars in metaphysics, the history of philosophy and moral theory. Kathy... (shrink)